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SCOOTING UNDER THE INFLUENCE: CRIMINAL 
LIABILITY IN THE AGE OF MICRO-TRANSIT 
Jacques Chouinard* 
Over the past two years, dockless electric scooters have become a 
staple of modern urban transit. Dockless electric scooters and 
other micro-transit devices present a unique challenge in the 
realm of criminal liability. Considering that electric scooters are 
lightweight, low-speed devices with an ambiguous regulatory 
status, how will driving under the influence statutes be enforced 
when scooter riders inevitably “scoot” while intoxicated? This 
question requires rapid and innovative answers; scooter riders in 
a number of jurisdictions have already been charged under 
existing driving under the influence statutes with varying levels of 
success. 
This comment seeks to provide those answers by examining the 
current and historical state of driving under the influence laws as 
applied to non-automobile transportation devices. Concluding 
that the current body of law in this area is ambiguous, inequitable, 
and antiquated, the comment then proposes a two-part answer to 
the question of intoxicated scooter riders’ criminal liability. The 
legislature should first create a statutory definition that affords 
legal status to micro-transit devices, including electric scooters. 
Then, the legislature should create a new statutory crime 
addressing this issue. The statute should provide proportional 
criminal penalties that serve as more effective deterrents. This 
approach is preferable to a judicial remedy, as the slow pace of 
the judiciary cannot match the rapid growth of the micro-transit 
industry. Finally, the Appendix to this comment provides model 
statutes that legislators can use as a guide in drafting new and 
effective rules concerning criminal liability in the micro-transit 
context. 
INTRODUCTION 
Are intoxicated electric scooter operators guilty of driving under the 
influence? Not long ago, the answer to this question would have been a legal 
curiosity. However, dockless electric scooters have since become ubiquitous in urban 
centers across the United States.1 A dockless electric scooter is a two wheeled, 
 
* University of New Mexico, Class of 2021. I would like to thank Professor Carol M. Suzuki, Professor J. 
Walker Boyd, and the staff of the New Mexico Law Review for their valuable insights during a lengthy 
writing process. I would also like to thank Chris A. Dodd at Freedman, Boyd, Hollander, Urias, & Ward, 
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electrically powered device with handlebars and a floorboard designed to be ridden 
from a standing position.2 The rapid and loosely regulated distribution of electric 
scooters by ridesharing companies, in addition to the commercial availability of 
electric scooters, has led to charges for driving under the influence in multiple 
jurisdictions.3 Currently, New Mexico law is silent with regards to the regulatory 
status of dockless electric scooters and other micro-transit devices. 
Part I of this comment examines how New Mexico law approaches non-
automobile vehicles in the context of DUI with an emphasis on statutory and judicial 
inconsistency. The leading authority addressing the definition of the term “vehicle” 
as used in the state’s driving under the influence (“DUI”) statute is State v. Saiz.4 
There, a defendant was convicted under the state’s driving under the influence statute 
after drunkenly operating a moped.5 On appeal, the court held that any vehicle was 
subject to the broad language of New Mexico’s DUI statute6–including mopeds–and 
affirmed the conviction.7 The court broadly construed the term “vehicle” as defined 
by the Motor Vehicle Code to include any non-human powered device used to move 
a person along a road.8 
Part I also discusses how, in the intervening period, the New Mexico 
legislature enacted a statutory carve out for a type of alternative transportation device 
referred to as an electric personal assistive mobility device (“EPAMD”). EPAMDs 
share some similarities with modern electric scooters, but the statutory definition of 
EPAMD applies clearly to only one device: the Segway Personal Transporter. The 
statutory carve out exempted EPAMDs from the provisions of the Motor Vehicle 
Code and afforded EPAMD operators the same rights and responsibilities as 
pedestrians.9 This carve out created ambiguity between judicial and legislative 
approaches to non-automobile devices in the DUI context. 
 
P.A. whose advocacy and persistence inspired this Comment. Finally, I would like to thank my family for 
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1.See Samantha Raphelson, Dockless Scooters Gain Popularity and Scorn Across the U.S., NATIONAL 
PUBLIC RADIO, (Aug. 29, 2018, 4:29 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/29/643058414/dockless-
scooters-gain-popularity-and-scorn-across-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/JE78-8MQD]. 
 2. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 407.5 (West 2008) (This statute defines a “motorized scooter,” which is 
the functional equivalent of “dockless electric scooter” for the purposes of this comment). 
 3. See, e.g., Matthew Reisen, Woman Riding on Electric Scooter Charged with DWI, 
ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL (May 30, 2019, 11:39 PM), https://www.abqjournal.com/1322102/woman-on-
electric-scooter-charged-with-dwi.html [https://perma.cc/W4XZ-24K3]; 
Man Charged with DUI on Electric Scooter in Tempe, KTAR.COM (Feb. 5, 2019, 3:09 PM), 
https://ktar.com/story/2424957/man-charged-with-dui-on-electric-scooter-in-tempe 
[https://perma.cc/BZ9Q-8JLZ]; Police: Man Arrested After Riding E-Scooter Drunk Down 16th Street 
Mall, CBS4 DENVER (Oct. 2, 2018, 3:00 PM) https://denver.cbslocal.com/2018/10/02/man-arrested-
scooter-drunk-16th-street [https://perma.cc/SDF4-2Q9J]; Laura J. Nelson, Another First for Scooters in 
L.A.: A Conviction for Scooting Under the Influence, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Sep. 26 2018, 4:25 PM), 
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-scooter-dui-20180926-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/R87Z-DS9U]. 
 4. 2001-NMCA-035, 103 N.M. 333, 24 P.3d 365. 
 5. Id. at ¶ 1, 24 P.3d at 365. 
 6. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102 (2016). 
 7. Saiz, 2001-NMCA-035, ¶¶ 8–9, 24 P.3d at 367. 
 8. Id. ¶ 3, 24 P.3d at 366 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-419(B) (1990)). 
 9. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-3-1102 (C), (D) (2007). 
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New Mexico is not alone in grappling with how alternative transportation 
devices fit into existing statutory frameworks. Courts in Idaho,10 Kentucky,11 
Michigan,12 Minnesota,13 and North Carolina14 have applied, or declined to apply, 
DUI statutes to non-automobile devices. Part II discusses those decisions to illustrate 
the difficulty facing state judiciaries in defining new types of transportation devices. 
Part III analyzes the implications of applying current DUI penalties to 
electric scooters. In particular, this section will demonstrate that current DUI 
penalties are neither sufficiently deterrent nor proportionate when applied to 
intoxicated scooter operators. 
Part IV details the need for a new solution to the problem of operating 
scooters under the influence. Part IV then proposes a statutory definition for micro-
transit devices that covers electric scooters and similar lightweight, low-speed 
devices. Further, Part IV contemplates the new crime of operating a micro-transit 
device under the influence of alcohol or drugs and provides a framework for 
developing proportional, deterrent penalties. Part IV also addresses the feasibility of 
creating new statutory frameworks for dockless electric scooters and briefly details 
current legislative efforts in this arena. 
Finally, Part V illustrates why a legislative remedy is the preferable solution 
to this problem by showing that courts are ill-equipped to develop a body of law 
governing new transportation devices. 
BACKGROUND 
I. New Mexico’s Approach to Driving Under the Influence. 
A. Current Statutory Provisions. 
Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (“DUI”) is a statutory crime 
in all fifty United States.15 New Mexico’s Motor Vehicle Code16 defines the offense 
as the unlawful operation of a vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol.17 The 
term “vehicle” is also statutorily defined: 
[A vehicle is] every device in, upon or by which any person or 
property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, 
including any frame, chassis, body or unitized frame and body of 
any vehicle or motor vehicle, except devices moved exclusively 
 
 10. See State v. McKie, 417 P.3d 1001 (Idaho Ct. App. 2018); State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 2014). 
 11. See Adams v. Commonwealth, 275 S.W.3d 209, 210 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008). 
 12. See People v. Lyon, 872 N.W.2d 245 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015). 
 13. See State v. Greenman, 825 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013); State v. Brown, 801 N.W.2d 
186 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). 
 14. See State v. Crow, 623 S.E.2d 68 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
 15. See HEINONLINE, 50 STATE SURVEYS: DRUNK DRIVING (8th ed. 2019), https://heinonline-
org.unmlawlibrary.idm.oclc.org/HOL/NSSL?collection=nssl&law=DRUNK%20DRIVING&edition=8 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2020). 
 16. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-1-1 to -13-13 (2019). 
 17. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-8-102(A), (B) (2016). 
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by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or 
tracks.18 
These statutes seem straightforward under facial scrutiny. However, 
whether a device constitutes a vehicle for the purposes of Section 66-8-102 has not 
always been clear. New Mexico courts have had to determine which devices actually 
fit the definition of a vehicle in the DUI context. 
B. State v. Saiz and the New Mexico Motor Vehicle Code. 
In 2001, the New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed Nestor Saiz’s DUI 
conviction under Section 66-8-102.19 At the time of his arrest, Saiz was operating a 
moped.20 On appeal, Saiz argued that a moped, as defined by the New Mexico Motor 
Vehicle Code, was not a vehicle and was exempt from the provisions of Section 66-
8-102.21 
Saiz was a matter of first impression in New Mexico and required the court 
to interpret the statutory definitions of the terms “moped” and “vehicle” in relation 
to the state’s DUI statute.22 Since Section 66-8-102 forbids New Mexicans from 
driving any vehicle while intoxicated, the court first had to determine whether or not 
a moped was a vehicle under the statute.23 The New Mexico Motor Vehicle Code 
defined a moped as a “two-wheeled or three-wheeled vehicle with an automatic 
transmission and a motor having a piston displacement of less than fifty cubic 
centimeters, that is capable of propelling the vehicle at a maximum speed of not more 
than thirty miles per hour on level ground. . . . “24 The court held that this definition 
was consistent with the statutory definitions of vehicles and motor vehicles.25 
Further, the court reasoned that the definition of vehicle was broader than that of 
motor vehicle; motor vehicles are essentially a subset of the broader category of 
vehicles.26 For the purposes of the Motor Vehicle Code, Saiz’s moped was a vehicle 
because it was a device that transported a person along a highway and was not moved 
exclusively by human power. 
The remainder of the court’s analysis flowed from this foundation. The 
court construed Section 66-8-102 in concert with the definitional statutes for mopeds 
and vehicles: Section 66-8-102 applies to operators of any type of vehicle; a moped 
is a vehicle when the statutory definitions of those terms are read together; therefore, 
an operator of a moped is subject to Section 66-8-102’s prohibition of driving under 
the influence. 
 
 18. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-4.19(B) (2017). 
 19. See 2001-NMCA-035, ¶ 1, 130 N.M. 333, 24 P.3d 365. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. ¶¶ 2, 4, 24 P.3d at 366. 
 23. Id. ¶¶ 2–4, 24 P.3d at 366. 
 24. Id. ¶ 3, 24 P.3d at 366 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-4.11(F) (1998)). 
 25. Id. (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-4.19(B) (2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-4.11(I) (1998) 
(defining motor vehicles as “every vehicle that is self-propelled and every vehicle that is propelled by 
electric power obtained from batteries or from overhead trolley wires, but not operated upon rails”)). 
 26. Id. 
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Saiz also argued that the regulatory statute governing mopeds exempted 
moped operators from Section 66-8-102’s criminal penalties.27 The regulatory statute 
stated, in pertinent part, “Except as provided in Subsections A and B of this section, 
none of the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code relating to motor vehicles or 
motorcycles . . . shall apply to a moped.”28 Saiz argued that this exemption precluded 
his conviction, but the court disagreed. Construing the statutory definitions of 
vehicle, motor vehicle, and moped in concert with the moped regulatory provision, 
the court reasoned that Section 66-3-1101 only exempted mopeds from the 
provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code that regulated motor vehicles.29 Unfortunately 
for Saiz, Section 66-8-102 applied to all vehicles, not just those that fit the definition 
of motor vehicle.30 Drawing on its prior reasoning, the court held that mopeds were 
within the larger set of vehicles and affirmed Saiz’s conviction. 
State v. Saiz illustrates the classic method of statutory construction 
employed by New Mexico appellate courts. The court drew on the plain language of 
the statutory framework and construed the statutes so that they remained harmonious 
and logically consistent.31 Further, the court ensured that its interpretation remained 
consistent with the policy aims of Section 66-8-102. 
C. The Motor Vehicle Code’s Policy Aims. 
The Motor Vehicle Code’s policy aims were well articulated by the court 
in State v. Richardson, another case that analyzed the applicability of Section 66-8-
102 to alternative means of transportation.32 On August 27, 1990, James Richardson 
made the unfortunate decision to drink ten beers, get in a large tractor with a mower 
attachment, and attempt to mow weeds along an unpaved road in Chaves County, 
New Mexico.33 After demolishing a fence and uprooting a mailbox, Richardson was 
arrested, charged with DUI under Section 66-8-102(A), and convicted.34 Utilizing 
the same method of statutory construction employed in Saiz, the Court of Appeals 
held that a tractor fit the definition of a motor vehicle, subjecting tractor drivers to 
the provisions of Section 66-8-102.35 The court reasoned that statutory construction 
must give effect to the statute’s underlying public policy.36 According to the court, 
the underlying policy goal of Section 66-8-102 “is to prevent individuals who, either 
mentally or physically, or both, are unable to exercise the clear judgment and steady 
hand necessary to handle a vehicle with safety both to the individual and the 
public.”37 Exempting tractors from Section 66-8-102 would be contrary to the 
statute’s policy goals. Allowing tractor drivers to drive while intoxicated would 
 
 27. Id. ¶ 6, 24 P.3d at 366. 
 28. Id., 24 P.3d at 367 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-3-1101 (1981)). 
 29. Id. ¶ 7, 24 P.3d at 367. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. 1992-NMCA-041, 113 N.M. 740, 832 P.2d 801. 
 33. Id. ¶ 2, 832 P.2d at 801. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See id. ¶¶ 6–11, 832 P.2d at 802¬04. 
 36. Id. ¶ 8, 832 P.2d at 803. 
 37. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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create clear dangers to the public, and those dangers were much the same as those 
created by drunk drivers of other large motor vehicles.38 
New Mexico courts have also given effect to the policy goals of Section 66-
8-102 by interpreting driving under the influence as a strict liability crime. Strict 
liability crimes require a clear legislative intent that no mens rea is necessary for the 
crime.39 Strict liability crimes demonstrate that the legislature found an overly 
compelling public interest in prohibiting a particular course of conduct, regardless of 
material intent. In State v. Harrison, the court explicitly articulated the compelling 
public interest served by Section 66-8-102: “Obviously, the public’s interest in 
deterring individuals from driving while intoxicated is compelling. This is due to the 
dangers of the practice, not only to those who operate motor vehicles while under 
the influence, but also to those innocent individuals who are killed as a result of DWI 
accidents.”40 The court further reasoned that the risk from driving under the influence 
is amplified because such conduct is not only harmful to drunk drivers themselves, 
but to the public generally.41 
New Mexico courts have consistently held that the policy goals of Section 
66-8-102 are to protect the public and individuals from the dangers of drunk 
driving.42 This interpretation is evidenced by the broad construal of statutory 
definitions that bring non-automobile vehicles under the auspices of Section 66-8-
102. Further, courts have given effect to the legislature’s intent in prohibiting driving 
under the influence by interpreting the offense as a strict liability crime. 
D. Section 66-3-1102 and the Emergence of EPAMDs. 
New Mexico courts had ostensibly settled how Section 66-8-102 applies to 
non-automobile transportation devices. Shortly after State v. Saiz was decided, 
however, the New Mexico state legislature created a new statute defining “electric 
personal assistive mobility devices.” That statute raises questions about courts’ 
interpretation of the terms “vehicle.”43 For nearly twenty years, this inconsistency 
has not been an issue. Yet the emergence of dockless electric scooters has created a 
renewed need for reconciliation here. Electric scooters resemble EPAMDs but are 
distinct, and neither device is clearly contained within the statutory definition of 
“vehicle.” 
Understanding the origins of this inconsistency requires a trip back to the 
year 2001. Dean Kamen, a brilliant and somewhat eccentric inventor, debuted the 
Segway Personal Transporter (PT) on Good Morning America.44 The Segway was a 
“technological marvel”; it was ridden from a standing position and utilized advanced 
gyroscopic and computer technology to allow riders to control the device simply by 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. State v. Harrison, 1992-NMCA-139, ¶ 18, 115 N.M. 73, 846 P.2d 1082, 1086 (defining strict 
liability in the context of driving under the influence). 
 40. Id. ¶ 19, 846 P.2d at 1086. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See id.; see also State v. Saiz, 2001-NMCA-035, ¶ 1, 130 N.M. 333, 24 P.3d 365.. 
 43. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-3-1102 (2007). 
 44. Jordan Golson, Well, That Didn’t Work: The Segway is a Technological Marvel. Too Bad It 
Doesn’t Make Any Sense, WIRED (10:00 AM, Jan. 6, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/01/well-didnt-
work-segway-technological-marvel-bad-doesnt-make-sense [https://perma.cc/P4DH-52NK]. 
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shifting their body weight forward and back.45 The Segway PT was hailed as 
revolutionary and was expected to completely reshape modern urban transit.46 
Segway lobbyists spread out across the country, working to convince state and 
federal legislators to create a regulatory environment that would allow Segways onto 
sidewalks, bike paths, and roads.47 These lobbying efforts worked; state legislatures 
across the country created new statutory frameworks that defined and regulated a 
new device called an “electric personal assistive mobility device.”48 The statutory 
definition of EPAMDs was essentially uniform: an EPAMD was a “self-balancing 
device having two non-tandem wheels designed to transport a single person by 
means of an electric propulsion system” with a maximum speed of twenty miles per 
hour.49 In other words, an EPAMD was a statutory creation that solely described the 
Segway PT. The regulations governing EPAMDs generally exempted them from 
licensure and registration requirements, with some states going so far as to grant 
EPAMD operators the same status as pedestrians.50 New Mexico’s statute was 
particularly kind to these devices as it included language implying that Segway PTs 
and their operators were exempt from all other provisions of the state’s Motor 
Vehicle Code.51 
The regulatory landscape seemed clear for a transit revolution led by 
Segway riders across the country. The revolution, however, never came. The Segway 
PT was expensive, heavy, and awkward; cities and the people who lived in them 
were reluctant to embrace the device.52 In an instance emblematic of the company’s 
misfortune, President George W. Bush was photographed falling off a Segway while 
on vacation in Maine.53 President Bush, unlike the company, was unharmed.54 As 
sales expectations failed to materialize, Segway struggled to actualize its vision.55 
The Segway PT faded into obscurity, relegated to the mundane world of guided tours 
and security patrols.56 The statutes regulating EPAMDs remained on the books, legal 
reminders of a failed experiment in human transportation. 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Matt MacFarland, Segway Was Supposed to Change the World. Two Decades Later, It Just 
Might, CNN BUSINESS, (1:04 PM, Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/30/tech/segway-
history/index.html [https://perma.cc/F9LT-VMB6]. 
 47. See Jim VandeHei, Lobbying to Put the Segway on the Profit Path, THE WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 
24, 2003), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/02/24/lobbying-to-put-the-segway-
on-profit-path/6a87b91b-e3b3-45eb-8c80-3b4347d55710 [https://perma.cc/YL4Z-UX2L]. 
 48. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-289h (2002) (defining electric personal assistive mobility 
devices); MINN. STAT. § 169.212 (2002) (also defining electric personal assistive mobility devices); 2002 
N.M. Laws, Ch. 38, §1 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-3-1102) (defining and setting baseline 
regulations for electric personal assistive mobility devices); OR. REV. STAT. § 814.550 (2003). 
 49. See id.; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-4.5(A) (2007). 
 50. See, e.g., 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-1005.1 (2003); MINN. STAT. § 169.212; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 
66-3-1102. 
 51. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-3-1102(D) (2007) (“Except as provided in this section, no other provisions 
of the New Mexico Motor Vehicle Code shall apply to electric personal assistive mobility devices.”). 
 52. See Golson, supra note 44. 
 53. Bush Fails the Segway Test, BBC NEWS (11:40 AM, June 14, 2003), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2989000.stm [https://perma.cc/DU9Z-24X7]. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See MacFarland, supra note 46. 
 56. Golson, supra note 44. 
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II. Jurisdictional Applications of DUI Statutes to Non-Automobile Devices. 
Even before the Segway tried and failed to dominate urban transportation, 
courts grappled with the application of DUI statutes to non-automobile devices. This 
section discusses national trends in how state and federal courts have applied DUI 
statutes to such devices, extending beyond State v. Richardson57 and State v. 
Harrison.58 Courts are inclined to extend the scope of DUI statutes to include non-
automobile devices, although this is not a uniform rule. As devices stray from the 
traditional notion of a vehicle as a car or truck, judicial uniformity varies. 
A. Farm Tractors. 
Recalling State v. Richardson, the New Mexico Court of Appeals has held 
that farm tractors are vehicles in the context of DUI.59 The court noted that the New 
Mexico Motor Vehicle Code defined farm tractors as “every motor vehicle designed 
and used primarily as a farm implement for drawing plows, mowing machines, and 
other implements of husbandry.”60 The court further reasoned that the DUI statute 
was not limited to vehicles with a specific function but rather included all vehicles.61 
The court held that farm tractors were vehicles for the purposes of the DUI statute 
because the statute’s policy goals were served by defining tractors as vehicles. 
Appellate courts in several other states have utilized similar reasoning in 
determining that farm tractors are vehicles for the purpose of DUI statutes.62 Further, 
some of those courts have held that tractors are motor vehicles in the context of DUI, 
even when tractors are exempted from motor vehicle regulations by other statutory 
provisions.63 This judicial reasoning is in line with the underlying policy of DUI 
statutes; farm tractors are large vehicles that can become serious threats to public 
safety when their operators are intoxicated. 
B. Utility Type Vehicles. 
A utility type vehicle (“UTV”) is a four-wheeled vehicle akin to a golf cart 
that is designed to handle off-road terrain.64 In State v. Trusdall, an Idaho court 
considered whether an intoxicated UTV operator could be convicted under the state’s 
DUI statute.65 There, Trusdall was arrested and charged after police found her doing 
donuts in a church parking lot in her Polaris Ranger, a type of UTV.66 Trusdall had 
a half-empty beer in the vehicle and was accompanied by six unhelmeted children.67 
 
 57. 1992-NMCA-041, 113 N.M. 740, 832 P.2d 801. 
 58. 1992-NMCA-139, 115 N.M. 73, 846 P.2d 1082. 
 59. See Richardson, 1992-NMCA-041, ¶ 14,832 P.2d at 804. 
 60. Id. ¶ 3, 832 P.2d at 802 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102(A)) (original emphasis retained). 
 61. Id. ¶ 10, 832 P.2d at 803. 
 62. See, e.g., State v. Laker, 939 N.E.2d 1111, 1114 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); Nemeth v. Commonwealth, 
944 S.W.2d 871, 872 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997); City of Wauseon v. Badenhop, 459 N.E.2d 867, 870 (Ohio 
1984); State v. Sohn, 535 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). 
 63. See Laker, 939 N.E.2d at 1114; see also Sohn, 193 N.W.2d at 5. 
 64. See IDAHO CODE § 67-7101(17) (2019). 
 65. See 155 Idaho 965, 968 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014). 
 66. Id. at 967–68. 
 67. Id. at 968. 
496 NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW Vol. 50; No. 3 
The district court dismissed Trusdall’s charges, reasoning that the UTV was not a 
motor vehicle for the purposes of Idaho’s general DUI statute; further, Idaho had a 
UTV-specific DUI statute which precluded prosecution under the general statute.68 
The appellate court reversed.69 The court held that a UTV was a motor 
vehicle for the purposes of the general DUI statute.70 The court relied on Idaho’s 
statutory definition of a vehicle as “[a] device in, upon, or by which any person or 
property may be transported or drawn upon a highway . . . “71 in conjunction the 
state’s definition of motor vehicles which included motorized devices.72 Construing 
these definitions in light of the state’s DUI statute, the court reasoned that UTVs fit 
the definitions of vehicles and motor vehicles because UTVs are motorized and can 
transport people on a highway.73 
Trusdall demonstrates how prohibition of intoxicated operation of UTVs—
devices with distinct similarities to automobiles—serves the policy goals of DUI 
statutes and allows for statutory construction that defines UTVs as motor vehicles. 
C. Mopeds. 
Mopeds provide an excellent example of how courts have attempted to 
reconcile state DUI statutes with alternative, non-automobile transportation devices. 
A moped is commonly defined as “a lightweight, low-powered motor bike that can 
be pedaled.”74 In other words, mopeds are hybrid devices propelled by human or 
motor power. Mopeds are unique in that they do not fit the general mold of an 
automobile or motorcycle but are allowed on public roads. Mopeds are subject to 
licensure requirements and operational restrictions in some jurisdictions.75 Thus, 
mopeds straddle the line between vehicle and non-vehicle transportation device. 
Courts tend to classify mopeds as motor vehicles for the purposes of DUI, 
although this trend is not completely uniform. In Adams v. Commonwealth, a 
Kentucky court affirmed a DUI conviction for a moped rider. The court reasoned 
that a moped was a motor vehicle under the state’s DUI statute because a moped is 
a means of transporting a person and is self-propelled.76 The court further noted that 
several other states consider mopeds to be vehicles in the DUI context even though 
those states exempt mopeds from other regulatory provisions.77 The Kentucky 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 972. 
 70. Trusdall, 155 Idaho at 968 (citing IDAHO CODE § 18-8004). 
 71. Id. at n.2. 
 72. Id. at 969 (citing IDAHO CODE § 49-123(2)(g)). 
 73. Id. at 970. 
 74. Moped, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/moped 
[https://perma.cc/2FRM-XQT5]. 
 75. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 4198M; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-3-1101 (1981); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 20-140.4 (2016). 
 76. See Adams v. Commonwealth, 275 S.W.3d 209, 210 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008). 
 77. Id. (citing State v. Saiz, 2001-NMCA-035, ¶ 6, 130 N.M. 333, 24 P.3d 365, 367; State v. 
Singleton, 460 S.E.2d 573, 575 (S.C. 1995)). 
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court’s reasoning reflects the majority approach taken by courts in applying DUI 
statutes to mopeds.78 
One court has disagreed with the majority approach to mopeds. Interpreting 
Washington state law, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a DUI conviction 
where the defendant was operating a moped.79 In a familiar exercise of statutory 
construction, the court interpreted Washington’s statutory definition of vehicle in 
concert with the state’s moped regulations and DUI statutes.80 The court examined 
the history of the moped, noting that a rise in moped popularity corresponded with 
legislative efforts to classify and regulate the devices.81 The court noted that the 
Washington legislature did not classify mopeds as vehicles, in contrast to other 
devices that were explicitly included in the statutory definition.82 Moreover, in 
subsequent amendments to the state’s moped regulations, “[the legislature] did not 
choose to bring moped within the full definition of motor vehicles, as it did with 
bicycles, when it amended the [statutory definition of vehicle].”83 The court reasoned 
that the legislature did not demonstrate clear intent that mopeds should be covered 
by the state’s DUI statute, exempting mopeds from the strictures of the statute.84 
D. Electric Personal Assistive Mobility Devices. 
As discussed above, the electric personal assistive mobility device 
(EPAMD) is a statutory definition created in response to the Segway PT. In State v. 
Greenman, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed a district court’s dismissal of 
DUI charges against a man arrested for riding a Segway PT while intoxicated.85 The 
court analyzed Minnesota’s EPAMD regulatory statute to determine how it 
interacted with the DUI statute. First, the court reasoned that a Segway PT fit the 
definition of an EPAMD because the Segway PT was a “two-wheeled, self-
balancing, battery powered device designed for use in places a car or bicycle cannot 
go.”86 The defendant’s Segway was excluded from the provisions of the state’s motor 
vehicle regulations because the definition of motor vehicle specifically excluded 
EPAMDs.87 The court noted that EPAMD operators were granted the “rights and 
responsibilities of a pedestrian” by other traffic regulations and that EPAMDs were 
required to operate on sidewalks and in bike paths.88 The court held that a Segway 
was not a vehicle in the context of DUI because vehicles were defined as devices 
 
 78. See Gregory J. Swain, Annotation, Operation of Mopeds and Motorized Recreational Two-, 
Three-, and Four-Wheeled Vehicles as Within Scope of Driving While Intoxicated Statutes, 32 A.L.R. 5th 
659, §§ 3[a], 3[b] (2019). 
 79. United States v. Dotson, 34 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 80. See id. at 883–85. 
 81. See id. at 885. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 886. 
 84. See id. 
 85. 825 N.W.2d 387, 389 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013). 
 86. Id. at 391. 
 87. See id. (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.011). 
 88. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.212). 
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that transported people along highways; by confining EPAMDs to sidewalks and 
bike paths, the legislature demonstrated its intent that EPAMDs were not vehicles.89 
The Minnesota court’s holding in Greenman may be the only such holding 
in the United States. A broad survey of American case law and legal encyclopedias 
reveals no analogous decisions. However, Greenman shows that courts will not 
automatically extend the provisions of DUI statutes to non-automobile transportation 
devices with unclear regulatory status. 
E. Electric Scooters. 
Much like EPAMDs, precedent surrounding electric scooters is scant. 
However, in 2005, Kevin Crowe was arrested in Hyde County, North Carolina, after 
he and a companion were seen operating “stand up scooters” in a disorderly 
fashion.90 The court described the scooters as “skateboard[s] with handlebars on the 
front” with two wheels arranged in a tandem fashion driven by an electric motor.91 
In other words, the defendant was operating an early version of the modern dockless 
electric scooter. The defendant was charged and convicted under North Carolina’s 
DUI statute and sentenced to a year of probation.92 
On appeal, the court interpreted North Carolina’s definition of vehicle to 
include the defendant’s “stand up scooter.”93 The court reasoned that the scooter was 
a device which drew the defendant along a highway, fitting the statutory definition 
of vehicle.94 Further, the court noted that the scooter did not fit the listed exceptions 
to that definition. First, the statute provided an exemption for devices used to enhance 
mobility. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the scooter served this 
function, stating that the defendant was a healthy 25-year-old man who required no 
mobility enhancement.95 Second, and more relevant for the purpose of this comment, 
the statute excluded EPAMDs from the definition of “vehicle.”96 The defendant 
argued that his scooter fell under the North Carolina definition of an EPAMD (which 
was functionally equivalent to New Mexico and Minnesota EPAMD definitions).97 
The court also rejected this argument, holding that the scooter was not an EPAMD 
because it was not self-balancing and its wheels were arranged in a tandem fashion.98 
Thus, the “standing scooter” fit neither exception to the definition of “vehicle” and 
was subject to the provisions of North Carolina’s DUI statute.99 
Notably, the court also discussed the underlying policy of North Carolina’s 
statute and commented on the legislature’s responsibility in this realm. The court 
noted that the defendant’s conduct could have subjected himself, other pedestrians, 
 
 89. Id. at 392. 
 90. See State v. Crowe, 623 S.E.2d 68, 69 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. at 70–71. 
 94. Id. at 71 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-4.01(49)). 
 95. Crowe, 623 S.E.2d at 71. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See id. at 72. 
 98. Id. at 71. 
 99. Id. at 72. 
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and drivers to a “high degree of danger.”100 This created a situation that the 
prohibition on DUI was expressly designed to prevent.101 The court further opined 
that it believed “the decision as to whether to exclude scooters [from the definition 
of vehicle] is best left in the hands of the General Assembly.”102 Crowe is an explicit 
example of how legislatures can and should solve the problem of applying DUI 
statutes to non-traditional transportation devices. 
ANALYSIS & PROPOSAL 
III. Applying Current DUI Penalties to Electric Scooters is Ineffective and 
Disproportionate. 
The policy aims of New Mexico’s DUI statute,103 as established in 
numerous appellate decisions, are to protect the public from the hazard of intoxicated 
drivers and to protect individuals from harming themselves while driving drunk.104 
This policy is executed by imposing criminal penalties on drivers convicted under 
the statute.105 A first-time conviction under Section 66-8-102 can yield significant 
punishment; possibilities include 90-days of imprisonment, a $500 fine, one year of 
probation, community service, and attendance of drug or alcohol rehabilitation 
programs.106 Further, a first time DUI conviction requires defendants to obtain an 
ignition interlock device at their own cost107 and may result in driver’s license 
revocation for one year.108 These penalties understandably escalate for aggravating 
circumstances and subsequent convictions.109 
The deterrent effect of Section 66-8-102 seems to be working, at least in 
part; in 2018, 38 fewer people died on New Mexico roads in alcohol-related crashes 
than in 2017.110 These circumstances, however, raise a question: would road deaths 
and injuries be significantly decreased by imposing the same harsh penalties on 
electric scooter operators? 
The answer to this question is beyond the scope of this comment as it would 
involve significant amounts of data collection and analysis on the transportation 
habits of large populations. However, a facial legal analysis demonstrates the 
disproportionality in applying current DUI laws to electric scooters and other micro-
transit devices. The degree of risk posed by a certain course of conduct is inherently 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102 (2016). 
 104. See generally State v. Johnson, 2001-NMSC-001, 130 N.M. 6, 15 P.3d 1233; State v. Richardson, 
1992-NMCA-041, 113 N.M. 740, 832 P.2d 801; State v. Harrison, 1992-NMCA-139, 115 N.M. 73, 846 
P.2d 1082. 
 105. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102(E)-(T) (2016). 
 106. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102(E) (2016). 
 107. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102(O) (2016). 
 108. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-29(C) (2007). 
 109. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102 (2016). 
 110. ASSOCIATED PRESS, DWI Traffic Deaths Down in New Mexico for 2018, ALBUQUERQUE 
JOURNAL (Jan. 11, 2019, 8:26 AM), https://www.abqjournal.com/1267121/dwi-traffic-deaths-down-in-
new-mexico-for-2018.html [https://perma.cc/HRW7-TGLA]. 
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tied to the severity of the criminal punishment. Indeed, a fundamental principle of 
American law holds that punishment must be proportionate to the crime.111 
In the case of electric scooters, the punishment imposed by Section 66-8-
102 is disproportionate to the act of operating a scooter while intoxicated for two 
main reasons. First, the license revocation and ignition interlock penalties do nothing 
to deter the use of electric scooters. The New Mexico Motor Vehicle Code does not 
define electric scooters, much less require a driver’s license for their operation. 
License revocation does nothing to legally prevent convicted defendants from 
operating scooters. The same rationale applies to the interlock requirement: 
interlocks are not applicable to electric scooters and do nothing to prevent people 
from drinking and operating scooters. These penalties do not prevent people from 
operating scooters while intoxicated in the post-conviction setting, showing that the 
interlock and license revocation penalties are not logically tied to preventing 
intoxicated scooter operation. 
In order to illustrate the second reason for Section 66-8-102’s 
disproportionality, consider a hypothetical. Imagine that a young woman was 
charged with DUI after scooting around a large urban center after a night out. She 
was convicted and subjected to the full range of penalties imposed by Section 66-8-
102. The purpose of this conviction would be, ostensibly, to deter the young woman 
and others like her from operating scooters while intoxicated. This may serve the 
compelling public safety rationales underlying a strict liability crime like driving 
under the influence. However, the criminal and administrative penalties imposed by 
a conviction under Section 66-8-102 are disproportionate to the risks created by 
electric scooter operators. These risks pale in comparison to the those posed by the 
larger, faster devices and automobiles contemplated by the statute. 
Consider the differences between the size and speed of electric scooters and 
other devices subject to DUI statutes. A review of commercially available dockless 
electric scooters shows that these devices are small, light, and limited to low speeds. 
They tend to weigh between thirty and forty pounds and are have maximum speeds 
between fifteen and twenty miles per hour.112 In contrast, even small automobiles 
routinely weigh in excess of 2,000 pounds and can reach highway speeds in short 
order. The Honda Fit, for example, is one of the smallest commercially available 
cars113 yet weighs nearly 2,500 pounds and can reach 84 miles per hour in 16 
seconds.114 Had the young woman above chosen to drive a 2,000 pound car instead 
of a small electric scooter, her risk of injuring others or destroying property would 
have been exponentially greater. 
 
 111. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 2.14(f) (3d ed. 2000). 
 112. See, e.g., Ninebot Kickscooter by Segway ES4, SEGWAY, https://store.segway.com/segway-
ninebot-kickscooter-es4 [https://perma.cc/UPG8-62HS]; INOKIM QUICK 3-Super Electric Scooter, 
INOKIMUSA, https://inokimusa.com/models/quick-3-super/#quick [https://perma.cc/JHR7-GBM4]; 
Hiboy MAX Electric Scooter, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/dp/B07V8H6LPX (last visited Oct. 23, 
2019). 
 113. See Joel Patel, 15 Smallest Cars on the Market, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (July 9, 2019), 
https://cars.usnews.com/cars-trucks/smallest-cars-on-the-market. 
 114. Michael Cantu, 2018 Honda Fit Sport First Test Review: Where Practicality and Fun Meet, 
MOTORTREND (May 2, 2018), https://www.motortrend.com/cars/honda/fit/2018/2018-honda-fit-sport-
first-test-review [https://perma.cc/NTE5-W5EC]. 
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The size and weight imbalances between electric scooters and other devices 
illustrate the disproportionate nature of imposing DUI penalties on scooter operators. 
In State v. Richardson,115 DUI statutes logically extended to large vehicles such as 
farm tractors. The size and weight of farm tractors create obvious hazards to their 
own operators and other road users; even a small tractor can weigh 1,500 pounds.116 
Similarly, utility type vehicles also share significant physical characteristics with 
automobiles. A typical UTV is the Polaris Ranger, which was the vehicle operated 
by the defendant in State v. Trusdall.117 A Polaris Ranger weighs approximately 
1,400 pounds and has a top speed of 62 miles per hour.118 While mopeds are smaller 
vehicles, they have a statutorily mandated top speed of 30 miles per hour119—nearly 
double the top speed of most dockless electric scooters. The risk of injury or death 
in vehicle collisions greatly increases for vehicles travelling faster than 20 miles per 
hour, demonstrating the increased risk posed by mopeds and other high-speed 
devices.120 
In contrast with each of these devices, electric scooters are physically 
incapable of inflicting the same level of harm because of their small size and slow 
speeds. Imposing DUI penalties intended for far more dangerous vehicles on electric 
scooter operators demonstrates the penalties’ disproportionality. 
A more analogous device to electric scooters is the Segway PT. The current 
iteration of Segway’s original personal transporter is the Segway PT i2 SE.121 The 
device weighs approximately 105 pounds, including its batteries,122 and has a top 
speed of 12.5 miles per hour with a maximum rider weight of 260 pounds.123 While 
the Segway PT is over twice the weight of most dockless electric scooters, the PT’s 
top speed is considerably lower: 12.5 miles per hour is a brisk run, while 18 or 20 
miles per hour exceeds the physical limits of most human beings. The Minnesota 
Court of Appeals decision in State v. Greenman124 is borne out by these figures: the 
policy concerns underlying DUI statutes address public safety, and a slow-moving, 
relatively light-weight device poses much less risk to the public than other large, 
high-speed vehicles. The penalties for operating electric scooters while intoxicated 
 
 115. 1992-NMCA-041, 113 N.M. 740, 832 P.2d 801. 
 116. See Compact Tractor Spec Guide, COMPACT EQUIPMENT (June 13, 2013), 
https://compactequip.com/tractors/compact-tractor-spec-guide [https://perma.cc/5YYD-9R46]. 
 117. 155 Idaho 965, 967 (Ct. App. 2014). 
 118. UTV Shootout: Kawasaki Mule PRO-FXT vs. Polaris Ranger CP 900, DIRTWHEELS MAGAZINE 
(July 24, 2015), https://dirtwheelsmag.com/utv-shootout-kawasaki-mule-pro-fxt-vs-polaris-ranger-xp-
900 [https://perma.cc/LS53-DSC5]. 
 119. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-3-1101(D) (1981). 
 120. Cf. Lena Groeger, Unsafe at Many Speeds, PROPUBLICA (May 25, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/unsafe-at-many-speeds [https://perma.cc/CF84-KSKW] (detailing 
studies establishing that risk of injury and death for pedestrians increases greatly as vehicle speeds rise 
above 20 miles per hour). 
 121. See SEGWAY, INC., USER MANUAL: SEGWAY PERSONAL TRANSPORTER (2019), 
https://www.segway.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/24010-00001_ab_pr_se_user_manual.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8265-TJ8N]. 
 122. Id. at 13, 86. 
 123. Id. at 12. 
 124. 825 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013). 
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should be proportional to the lower risk of harm.125 Current statutory penalties for 
DUI are not proportional to the risk of harm posed by intoxicated scooter operators 
and do not act as effective deterrents. 
IV. A New and Necessary Remedy. 
A. The Need. 
New Mexico’s driving under the influence statute was written and enacted 
in 1953, decades before the rise of dockless electric scooters and other alternative 
forms of urban transport.126 The statute has been amended twenty-five times since 
its initial passage; no single amendment considers alternative forms of transit, instead 
retaining the broad prohibition on the operation of vehicles while intoxicated.127 
Further, the statutory definition of vehicle was not created until 1990 and has not 
been amended since 2005.128 In 2001, State v. Saiz provided a judicial interpretation 
of the term “vehicle” in the context of DUI in New Mexico.129 The legislature then 
established the state’s electric personal assistive mobility device statute in 2002, 
quickly creating ambiguity between the holding in Saiz and the updated Motor 
Vehicle Code.130 
New Mexico law regulating driving under the influence as applied to non-
automobile devices requires an update. The emergence of dockless electric scooters 
in cities like Albuquerque131 and Las Cruces132 has created a need for clarification 
regarding the status of these devices in relation to the state’s DUI statute. As early 
as six days after dockless electric scooters were distributed in Albuquerque, a woman 
was arrested and charged with DUI after operating a scooter while intoxicated.133 
The DUI charges were dismissed in that case after the defendant pled to a lesser 
charge,134 but the incident demonstrates the need for legal clarification. The likely 
reoccurrence of such conduct underscores the need for action. Doing nothing here, 
or simply exempting scooter operators from criminal liability under the state DUI 
 
 125. Cf. LAFAVE, supra note 111, at §2.14(f). 
 126. See 1953 N.M. Laws 357-58. 
 127. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102 (2019). 
 128. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-4.19 (2019). 
 129. 2001-NMCA-035, ¶ 4, 130 N.M. 333, 24 P.3d 365, 366. 
 130. See 2002 N.M. Laws 231-32. 
 131. Jessica Dyer, Rental E-Scooters Are Hitting Albuquerque Streets, ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL (May 
24, 2019, 1:53 PM), https://www.abqjournal.com/1320035/e-scooters-hit-albuquerque-streets.html 
[https://perma.cc/WP4T-DVGL]. 
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 133. See Matthew Reisen, Woman Riding on Electric Scooter Charged with DWI, ALBUQUERQUE 
JOURNAL (May 30 2019, 11:39 PM), https://www.abqjournal.com/1322102/woman-on-electric-scooter-
charged-with-dwi.html [https://perma.cc/SE5M-7GYT]. 
 134. See Jeannie Nguyen, Albuquerque Woman Caught Driving Drunk on E-Scooter Dodges DWI 
Conviction, KRQE.COM (Sept. 23, 2019, 5:30 PM), https://www.krqe.com/news/albuquerque-
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statute, would fail to deter conduct that could put the public at risk. Dockless electric 
scooters require a more thoughtful regulatory approach. 
B. The Proposal. 
The proper venue in which to address this problem is the legislature. The 
New Mexico legislature should formulate a statutory scheme that accounts for the 
risks posed by intoxicated scooter operators while adhering to principles of 
proportionality. The proposal is two-fold: first, the legislature should define dockless 
electric scooters and other micro-transit devices; second, the legislature should create 
a new class of criminal penalty directed at preventing intoxicated scooter operation. 
The Appendix attached to this comment contains model statutes for both provisions. 
Using this comment’s model definition as a guide, the legislature should 
craft a flexible statutory definition that includes dockless electric scooters while 
allowing for the emergence of similar devices. A flexible definition accounts for 
future devices; one of the pitfalls of New Mexico’s EPAMD definition is that it is 
narrowly tailored to only include the Segway PT device.135 The rapid emergence of 
dockless electric scooters demonstrates how modern transit solutions are unlikely to 
fit into existing statutory molds. Lawmakers can avoid this legal uncertainty by 
allowing for some flexibility in the definition of electric scooters and other 
lightweight, low-speed devices. For the purposes of the statutory definition, these 
devices would be termed “micro-transit devices” in order to preclude a narrow 
application of the definition to electric scooters alone. New Mexico’s statutory 
definition of EPAMDs provides a template of sorts; simple modifications removing 
the non-tandem wheel requirement and imposing a weight restriction would create a 
flexible statute covering electric scooters and similar micro-transit devices. Crafting 
a new definition entirely from scratch is simply unnecessary. 
Once dockless electric scooters have a statutory definition, the legislature 
could turn to creating a proportional criminal penalty that effectively deters 
intoxicated scooter operation. Like the definition portion, legislators need not 
reinvent the wheel. Section 66-8-102 provides statutory language that could be 
modified to create a criminal penalty more in-line with the risks posed by intoxicated 
scooter operators. A new micro-transit device statute could retain Section 66-8-102’s 
core prohibitory substance136 while changing the phrases “to drive a vehicle” and 
 
 135. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-4.5(A) (2007). 
 136. The substantive portion of the Section 66-8-102 reads as follows: 
A. It is unlawful for a person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor to drive 
a vehicle within this state. 
B. It is unlawful for a person who is under the influence of any drug to a degree that 
renders the person incapable of safely driving a vehicle to drive a vehicle within this 
state. 
C. It is unlawful for: 
(1) a person to drive a vehicle in this state if the person has an alcohol concentration of 
eight one hundredths or more in the person’s blood or breath within three hours of 
driving the vehicle and the alcohol concentration results from alcohol consumed before 
or while driving the vehicle; or 
(2) a person to drive a commercial motor vehicle in this state if the person has an alcohol 
concentration of four one hundredths or more in the person’s blood or breath within 
three hours of driving the commercial motor vehicle and the alcohol concentration 
results from alcohol consumed before or while driving the vehicle. 
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“safely driving a vehicle” to “to operate a micro-transit device” and “safely operating 
a micro-transit device” (these changes are present in the Appendix’s model statute). 
The legislature could also retain a modified version of the language creating 
aggravating circumstances for the crime, particularly those circumstances that 
involve infliction of bodily harm. These actions would create a new class of crime 
called operating a micro-transit device while intoxicated. 
After the core prohibition, the new criminal statute would substantially 
depart from the language of Section 66-8-102. The model statute shown in the 
Appendix serves as a basic outline. The penalties imposed by the new statute should 
be proportional to the potential harm. The easiest penalties to eliminate would be the 
ignition interlock137 and mandatory license revocation138 penalties that accompany 
DUI convictions. These penalties are disproportionate and do nothing to prevent 
people from operating scooters while intoxicated. The legislature would also need to 
consider penalties involving fines, jail time, or probation. It seems intuitive that 
proportional penalties would involve lower fines and less jail or probation time given 
the lower risk posed by intoxicated scooter operators. The exact figures here would 
be subject to debate and legislative review. Ideally, the legislature would be able to 
determine the appropriate category in which the new crime would fall. Since 
penalties correlate with the severity of a crime,139 operating an electric scooter while 
intoxicated should be a petty misdemeanor as defined in the New Mexico Criminal 
Code.140 The statute should allow for elevation of the crime to misdemeanor or felony 
status to account for aggravating circumstances such as the infliction of bodily harm 
or prior convictions. These measures would create proportional criminal penalties 
for operating a scooter while intoxicated. Moreover, these measures would protect 
public safety by deterring the hazardous conduct of intoxicated scooter operation.141 
C. The Proposal’s Feasibility. 
A new statutory framework would be feasible and relatively 
uncontroversial. Dockless electric scooters may be the subject of strong and 
discordant personal opinions,142 but current legislative efforts around electric 
scooters have enjoyed bipartisan support. In 2019, bipartisan legislation setting 
 
 137. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102(O) (2016). 
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baseline regulatory provisions passed into law in Florida,143 New Jersey,144 
Tennessee,145 and Wisconsin.146 Electric scooter regulatory bills have also been 
introduced in other states and continue to move through the legislative process.147 
The bipartisan nature of these bills shows that legislators have recognized a need for 
solutions to the problems posed by electric scooters and are willing to formulate 
solutions. 
No current legislative effort answers the question of whether DUI statutes 
will apply to dockless electric scooters. If New Mexico was to pass such a bill, it 
would serve as a national example in determining the potential criminal liability of 
electric scooter riders. Legislators in New Mexico and across the country have 
clearly recognized that dockless electric scooters will require new regulatory 
frameworks. Prompt legislative action will make New Mexico one of the first states 
to develop a body of law addressing DUI as applied to the burgeoning micro-transit 
industry. 
V. Legislative Action is Preferable to a Judicial Approach. 
Application of current DUI penalties to dockless electric scooter operators 
is disproportionate and illogical. Without legislative action, the judiciary will be left 
to sort out how scooters and other micro-transit devices fit into existing statutory 
frameworks. As discussed in the background section of this comment, the litany of 
cases subjecting or exempting other non-automobile devices to DUI statutes has 
centered around statutory construction and judicial interpretation of terms like 
“vehicle” and “motor vehicle.” In those cases, courts were able to interpret DUI 
statutes, statutory definitions of various devices, and basic regulations of those 
devices in pari materia. New Mexico courts have utilized a similar analytic 
framework. In State v. Saiz, the court was able to draw on the state’s DUI statute, the 
statutory definitions of “vehicle” and “moped,” and the regulatory statute for mopeds 
in order to determine whether moped operators were subject to DUI penalties.148 
However, no statutory definition for dockless electric scooters exists in New Mexico 
law, nor is there any baseline regulatory statute for these devices. 
The only statutory provisions that could conceivably cover dockless electric 
scooters are the definition149 and regulatory statute150 for electric personal assistive 
mobility devices. Even these statutes do not explicitly define electric scooters and 
have some key differences. For example, the definition of an EPAMD mandates the 
device have two non-tandem wheels,151 while electric scooters have wheels arranged 
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2019); S.B. S05294A, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019). 
 148. See 2001-NMCA-035, ¶¶ 6–8, 130 N.M. 333, 24 P.3d 365. 
 149. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-4.5(A) (2007). 
 150. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-3-1102 (2007). 
 151. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-4.5(A). 
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in a tandem fashion. While EPAMDs have been judicially152 and statutorily153 
exempted from other motor vehicle regulations, the statutes regulating EPAMDs are 
an inexact fit for dockless electric scooters and other micro-transit devices. This 
creates a situation where the judiciary would have to fit a scooter-shaped problem 
into a Segway-shaped box; the solution is just as inelegant as the visual. 
Further, a judicial definition confining electric scooters within the New 
Mexico Motor Vehicle Code could result in a full application of the DUI statute to 
electric scooters. As of this writing, the broad holding in State v. Saiz has not been 
overruled and remains the controlling authority interpreting the term “vehicle.”154 
Principles of stare decisis create high barriers for reversing this precedent. New 
Mexico courts consider four factors prior to overruling precedent: (1) whether a 
precedent is unworkable; (2) the reliance on precedent; (3) the development of new 
legal principles; and (4) whether factual circumstances have changed in the 
intervening period so as to “[rob] the old rule” of its justification.155 While the broad 
definition of “vehicle” articulated in Saiz arose before the advent of dockless electric 
scooters, the central holding of the case is not so unworkable to warrant overruling 
it. Defining electric scooters as vehicles within the purview of the state’s DUI statute 
creates disproportionate penalties, but is not so absurd so as to be considered legally 
unworkable. Moreover, no new legal principles have emerged regarding electric 
scooters; rather, the issue here is a distinct lack of scooter-specific law. Finally, while 
the emergence of electric scooters in New Mexico cities represents a change in 
factual circumstances, that change does not indicate that the urban transit landscape 
is fundamentally different from the circumstances in Saiz. Dockless electric scooters 
do not rob the court’s interpretation of the term “vehicle” of its underlying 
justification. 
The North Carolina Court of Appeals decision in State v. Crowe156 is 
instructive. There, the court was called to determine the applicability of the North 
Carolina DUI statute to an early form of the dockless electric scooter.157 The court 
held that electric scooters were vehicles under the statutory definition of the term and 
were not covered by the statutory exemption of EPAMDs from other code 
provisions.158 Thus, electric scooters were covered by the state’s DUI statute.159 The 
court reasoned that defining the criminal liability of scooter operators was the 
express responsibility of the legislature, stating: 
Here, in a situation in which the legislature has allowed a limited 
number of very specific exceptions to a statute, it would be 
inappropriate for this Court to create another. The legislature may 
choose to make an exception for electric scooters such as the one 
 
 152. See State v. Greenman, 825 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013). 
 153. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-3-1102(D). 
 154. See 2001-NMCA-035, 130 N.M. 333, 24 P.3d 365. 
 155. Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶ 34, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305, 315. 
 156. 623 S.E.2d 68 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
 157. See id. at 70. 
 158. Id. at 72–73. 
 159. Id. at 73. 
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in this case. Until that time, we apply the statutory scheme as it has 
been enacted.160 
Ultimately, courts are responsible for interpreting statutory provisions, 
while the legislature is responsible for creating new ones. As the court noted in 
Crowe, this notion applies to electric scooters. The legislative proposal detailed in 
Part IV would be preferable to a slow and inefficient slog through the courts. 
CONCLUSION 
Dockless electric scooters are likely to become staples of modern life by 
providing an accessible, convenient, and inexpensive means of urban 
transportation.161 As they become more commonplace, the issue of intoxicated 
scooter operators will continue to frustrate judges and advocates working in the 
criminal justice system. Applying current regulatory frameworks to dockless electric 
scooters is disproportionate and does little to actually deter drunk electric scooter 
riders from taking to the streets. Further, New Mexico courts’ current interpretation 
of the term “vehicle” is overly broad and fails to account for the novelty of micro-
transit devices. 
The policy aims underlying the prohibition on DUI would be better served 
by a completely new approach. A legislative solution defining electric scooters and 
other micro-transit devices allows for the creation of a new class of crime called 
operating a micro-transit device under the influence. This new class of crime should 
be proportional to the lower risk posed by operators of electric scooters while also 
providing sufficient deterrent effect. Such action by the New Mexico legislature will 
put the state at the forefront of determining criminal liability in the context of electric 
scooters and other micro-transit devices. The proposals and rationales outlined in 
this comment are meant to inform that process. 
  
 
 160. Id. 
 161. See Patrick McGeehan, Riding While Drunk and Other Dangers of the Electric Scooter Craze, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2019, 8:10 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/06/nyregion/lime-scooter-
hoboken.html [https://perma.cc/X3J5-2WKN]. 
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APPENDIX: MODEL STATUTES 
Model Statutory Definition of Micro-Transit Devices: 
“Micro-transit device” means any self-propelled device weighing not more 
than 50 pounds designed to transport a single person at a maximum speed 
of 20 miles per hour across a paved level surface when powered solely by 
its own propulsion system. 
Model Statute for Operating a Micro-Transit Device Under the Influence: 
A. It is unlawful for a person who is under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor to operate a micro-transit device within this state. 
B. It is unlawful for a person who is under the influence of any drug to a 
degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a micro-transit 
device to operate a micro-transit device within this state. 
C. Operating a micro-transit device under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor occurs when: 
A person operates a micro-transit device within this state, and the person 
has an alcohol concentration of eight one hundredths or more in the person’s 
blood or breath within three hours of operating the micro-transit device and 
the alcohol concentration results from alcohol consumed before or while 
driving the device. 
D. Aggravated operating a micro-transit device under the influence consists 
of: 
(1) causing bodily injury to a human being as a result of the unlawful 
operation of a micro-transit device while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquors or drugs. 
(2) causing damage to private or public property, not including the micro-
transit device itself, as a result of the unlawful operation of a micro-transit 
device while under the influence of intoxicating liquors or drugs. 
(3) operating a micro-transit device while intoxicated subsequent to a prior 
conviction under this Section. 
E. A first-time conviction pursuant to subsections A or B is a petty 
misdemeanor. 
F. A conviction pursuant to subsection D is a misdemeanor or felony 
depending on the severity of the aggravating circumstances. 
G. A conviction pursuant to this section shall be punishable by 
imprisonment and fines of appropriate length and amounts as determined 
by the New Mexico Criminal Sentencing Act. 
